We study third 
I. Introduction
Price discrimination in intermediate good markets is prevalent especially in countries where such practices are not prohibited or in international markets where national antitrust laws do not apply. Perhaps counter-intuitively, models of third degree price discrimination have generally shown that a less efficient firm receives a discount from the monopolistic upstream firm relative to a more efficient firm. In these models, however, the importance of the timing of firm actions has been largely neglected.
Different sequences of play affect the strategic interactions between firms and can lead to different market outcomes. In this paper, we consider that downstream firms make complementary investments that lower production cost and then explore the consequence of timing of these investments in relation to price setting by upstream monopolist.
We study two models of vertical structure with different timing of investments made by the downstream firms. By saying investments, we mean the general costly activities that can be used to lower a firm's production cost. They may include, but are not limited to, R&D expenditures, managerial effort, and the purchase of fixed capital, etc. We show that if investment levels are chosen after the monopolist sets the prices of the intermediate good, a more efficient firm may end up paying a lower price than a less efficient firm. The timing of investments plays an important role: an indirect effect of input price on quantity demanded, through the change of downstream firms' investment incentives, must also be taken into account when the monopolist sets the prices before the downstream firms invest. Interestingly, we show that a change of sequence from one model (the upstream firm commits to input prices first) to the other (the upstream firm sets input prices after investments are made) benefits all parties including the upstream monopolist, the downstream firms and the consumers. Thus allowing the downstream firms to react to the price set by the upstream firm forces the upstream firm to internalize the effect of higher prices on reduced investment and leads to a Pareto improvement. This suggests firms have a strong incentive to structure a vertical relationship to achieve this, and makes the latter model an appealing choice for future research.
While the Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936 (often referred to as the Robinson-Patman Act) in the United States concerned primarily intermediate goods markets, most economic studies have been on price discrimination in the final goods markets. One of the main findings in this literature is that the monopolist should charge more in markets with lower elasticity of demand, an optimal pricing rule under third degree discrimination. (See, e.g., Tirole (1988) .) In a seminal paper, DeGraba (1990) employed a model with a monopoly supplier and two downstream producers who engage in Cournot competition in the final market. He showed that the supplier charges the lower cost producer a higher price than the higher-cost firm under price discrimination, partially offsetting the cost advantage. This was confirmed in Yoshida (2000) in an extension to n downstream firms with different α-β-efficiency (to produce one unit of the final good, one firm needs more of the input and also incurs a higher marginal cost). These theoretical findings are actually consistent with the results in final good markets that low elasticity is penalized. Demand for inputs from the lower cost firm is less elastic and thus it should be charged a higher price by the profit-maximizing upstream firm. What's different in a vertical structure, that faced by the upstream firm is derived demand based on a downstream firm's choice of output to supply in the final market.
Though theoretically intuitive, it contradicts many people's expectation that, being a larger buyer, a more efficient firm should be able to get a better deal. Katz (1987) first argued that a large downstream firm has higher ability to vertically integrate backward and consequently should be charged a lower price by the input provider.
Following a similar spirit, Inderst and Valletti (2009) showed that if there is threat of demand-side substitution the more efficient buyer receives a discount. Because the transaction cost for finding another supplier of the same inputs can be spread over a larger volume, this lower cost buyer is more likely to switch. The additional participation constraint leads to a lower price charged to it. Allowing the use of two-part tariff contracts, Inderst and Shaffer (2009) also showed that a more efficient firm obtains a lower wholesale price. By extracting all profits, the monopolist's interest is in line with the downstream firms and the wholesale prices are set to maximize industry profits. In this paper, we study price discrimination under linear pricing, without altering the upstream firm's monopolistic status.
Different from the extant literature which exogenously assumes downstream firms' marginal production costs, with one firm's cost being higher than another, we make costs of production endogenous by allowing firms to choose the level of complementary investment. One firm is more efficient than another if a lower cost of investment is incurred to reduce marginal cost to a same level. We distinguish two types of vertical structures which differ in the timing of downstream firms' investment choice. In a supplier-manufacturer type of vertical relationship, as we name it primarily for convenience, the marginal cost of a downstream firm is determined by its production technology which usually entails large scale investment and long time horizon, and thus is assumed to be done before the upstream supplier sets input prices. For a wholesalerretailer type of vertical relationship, a downstream firm's marginal cost in selling products in the final market may be highly variable and easily controllable due to choice of complementary inputs such as managerial effort, shelf space, etc. In this case, the downstream firms' choices of investment are more likely made after the input price is set and the profitability of this product is fully understood. It is worth noting that both DeGraba (1990) and Inderst and Valletti (2009) As has been discussed in the introduction, we focus on the circumstance when Using backward induction, we start with the downstream firms' choices of quantities, which also determine their demands for inputs in the intermediate good market.
In stage 3, given , the input price charged by the upstream firm, and , the cost of production it has chosen in stage 1, downstream firm i's optimal production level is given by:
(1) .
And the second order condition ensuring a unique interior solution is:
(2) . Write , we have , which means a downstream firm's demand for input decreases in the price charged by the upstream firm and increases in the cost reduction level it has chosen in the first stage.
Then in stage 2, given the cost reduction levels of the downstream firms, , the upstream supplier then sets input prices to solve:
The first order condition determines the input prices charged to each manufacturer:
.
The second order condition ensuring a unique interior solution is: .
Plugging in and , it can be written as: Condition (5) is stronger than the second order condition (4). Together with (2), it implies (4). It is valid for a number of demand functions including linear demand which we will use to derive a closed form solution. Other functions satisfying this condition include for , for and . 2 Under this condition, a downstream firm's benefit from cost reducing investments will be partially offset by a higher input price charged the upstream firm. Intuitively, investment lowers the production cost and raises the downstream firm's profit margin for each unit of 2 One exception we could think of is , which satisfies (4) but violates (5). In this case, and the monopolist charges a uniform price. production. Accordingly, the value of the input has increased and the upstream firm can ask for a higher price.
From Lemma 1, when condition (5) is satisfied, the downstream firm which has a lower marginal cost (determined by its chosen investment level in the first stage) will be charged a higher input price by the upstream firm. However, since the handicapping is only partial, , there is still incentive for the more efficient firm to select a lower cost technology, and consequently receive a higher price for each unit of the intermediate good. 
□ The Wholesaler-Retailers Model
We now turn to another model which differs in the timing of firm actions from the one discussed earlier. It may better characterize a wholesaler-retailers type of vertical structure in which the monopolistic upstream firm is a manufacturer of a consumer product under its unique brand name or an exclusive distributor of this manufacturer.
Final goods sold to consumers may be very close, in a physical sense, 3 to intermediate goods provided by the upstream wholesaler. The downstream firms are mainly in charge of selling them to consumers in the final good market. Few, if any, further production process is needed. However, the selling procedure may entail some costs which are easily variable and heavily impacted by managerial effort. For example, costs involved in organizing products on shelves, managing inventory, providing follow-up services, etc.
How much investment to spend on these procedures is more likely determined after prices of the intermediate goods have been set by the upstream firm so that a full costbenefit analysis can be conducted. As a result, we make a different assumption on the timing of the game that investments to lower production cost are chosen after the upstream firm sets the input prices.
The game is played in the following sequence: in stage 1, the upstream firm sets input prices, , charged to the downstream firms; in stage 2, downstream firms choose an investment level that lowers marginal cost of production; and in stage 3, downstream firms produce final goods and sell them in the final markets.
The third stage is the same as before. The optimal quantity is defined by (1) and we have the same first and second derivatives for . In stage 2, given the input price, , which was set by the upstream monopolist in the first stage, downstream firm i's objective function is then:
4 By plugging the optimal condition for quantity choice in the last stage (1) into the first order condition, we have the optimal level of cost reduction as defined by:
Write . With the second order condition being satisfied, we can prove the following comparative statics:
Lemma 2: , and .
The first comparative static in Lemma 2 says that with higher cost of investments, a downstream firm chooses a lower cost reduction level (or equivalently, lower investments), holding everything else constant. The second comparative static says that being charged a higher input price, the downstream firm chooses a lower cost reduction level. This is a very important result since it tells us that the upstream firm's pricing strategy in the first stage would affect a downstream firm's investment incentives, which in turn affect the quantity of inputs demanded from this downstream firm. In determining an input price charged to a downstream firm, the monopolist need consider both a direct effect and an indirect effect of this price on the derived quantities demanded as defined
by (1). From what we have had in the third stage, , affects directly, but also indirectly through its effect on , another determinant of . Suppose that the monopolist increases the price charged on firm i, , the direct effect will cause the downstream firm to decrease its demand of inputs since . But also, this will cause the firm to decrease its investment in the cost reduction technology, which again causes to decrease. This additional effect, as compared with that in the suppliermanufacturers model, will indeed affect the upstream firm's pricing strategy.
In the first stage, the upstream monopolist's problem is to solve:
The first order condition is:
Again, assume the second order conditions are satisfied in all ranges we consider ( ). Then, by differentiating (6) with respect to , we find how the optimal input prices vary with respect to the downstream firms' cost parameters:
, where .
With the denominator being negative, the sign of the partial derivative of the input price charged to firm i with respect to its efficiency coefficient is the same as the sign of , which is in general ambiguous. Thus we prove the following result: Unfortunately, the sign of this cross partial derivative is generally ambiguous without additional restrictions placed on the demand function and the cost functions.
However, under some common assumptions in the literature, when the final market has linear demand and the cost of investment can be expressed as the form , we do have and a positive second term in . 5 Having obtained these general intuitions, in the next section we will assume some specific functional forms of market demand and costs of investment to conduct further analyses on these three-stage models.
III. Timing of Investments
With the additional choice of investments, we find the timing of firm actions plays an important role. Under different sequences of play, the strategic interaction between firms is affected and the monopolist's pricing strategy changes. In the wholesaler-retailers model, the monopolist may charge a more efficient downstream firm a lower price, which contrasts with some established results from the literature. To further our analysis of the timing issue, we assume specific functional forms for the final market demand and the downstream firms' costs of investment.
Linear demand and quadratic investment costs have been widely used in the literature of price discrimination and R&D (e.g., D 'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; DeGraba, 1990) . To our understanding, this is the only option that can lead to a closed form solution. In the following, we assume the inverse demand function in market i is:
We normalize equal to one by the appropriate adjustment of output units and define to simplify notation.
Also, assume the costs of investment for downstream firm i is given by:
Firm i is more efficient than firm j if , and with at least one of the first two inequalities being strict. 6 To ensure that the firms' objective functions are well defined and a unique interior solution exists, we assume the following restrictions on the parameters are satisfied:
The coefficient on the linear term ( ) can be positive or negative. But if is negative, we only consider the range where rises. That is, if .
Also, we assume the constant term is not too big such that a zero investment solution is avoided. Using backward induction same as in the previous section, we can solve the equilibrium prices and cost reduction levels.
In the supplier-manufacturers model, the downstream firms choose:
(11) .
And the upstream monopolist sets the input prices as:
(12) , which decreses both in and in . As a result, consistent with the conclusion in Propositio 1, a less efficient firm is charged a lower price by the upstream monopolist.
In the wholesaler-retailers model, the downstream firms choose:
(13) , and the upstream firm sets the following input prices:
Since , which downstream firm receives a lower input price simply depends on the magnitude of . This yields the following result:
Proposition 3: With linear final market demand and quadratic investment costs, in the supplier-manufacturers model, the more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher input price than the less efficient firm. In the wholesaler-retailers model, the more efficient downstream firm (firm i) is charged a lower input price than the less efficient firm (firm j) if , a higher input price if , and an equal input price if .
These results illustrate the general conclusion found in the previous section. Since a linear demand function satisfies condition (5), the more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher input price than the less efficient firm in the supplier-manufacturers model. Also, the result is generally ambiguous in the wholesaler-retailers model. Under the assumed functional forms, whether the upstream firm charges a higher or lower price to the more efficient firm depends on the ratio of the coefficients on the quadratic term and the linear term. Suppose firm i is more efficient with and . If the less efficient firm j has and , then firm i will be charged a higher price than firm j, since . Instead, if firm j has and , then firm i will be charged a higher price than firm j, since . And if firm j has and , the upstream firm should charge these firms the same price for the intermediate good.
Thus we find a circumstance under which a more efficient firm receives a What is more interesting, the upstream monopolist also prefers this sequence of play, that is, letting the downstream firms choose a production technology after it has set the input prices.
Proposition 5: With linear final market demand and quadratic investment costs, the upstream monopolist earns a higher profit in the wholesaler-retailers model than in the supplier-manufacturers model.
Considering that the upstream monopolist charges higher prices in the suppliermanufacturers model than in the wholesaler-retailers model, this is quite striking result.
Proposition 5 tells that its gain from selling a larger amount of the intermediate good outweighs the higher prices it charges for each unit it sells to the downstream firms. Since both parties are better off under this sequence of play, the wholesaler-retailers model is probably a more reasonable choice especially when at least one of the two parties is flexible in the timing of its strategies. Of course, the upstream firm has an incentive to renege on its set price and charge a higher price after observing the downstream firm's investment level. In real world settings, signing a contract can easily solve the problem.
The welfare implication of these comparisons is straightforward. Since all the firms gain under the wholesaler-retailers model, and a higher quantity is sold by the upstream firm which implies higher final outputs and higher consumer surplus, social welfare is improved in the wholesaler-retailers model when compared to that in the supplier-manufacturers model. Under the supplier-manufacturers model, choosing the lower cost technology by investments are partially penalized by a higher input prices set by the upstream firm. This causes lower investment levels, lower output level and lower social welfare. This is partly corrected when the investment choices are made after the input prices are set in the wholesaler-retailers model. An indirect effect will be taken into consideration and the monopolistic power of the upstream firm is refrained from harming social welfare, at least to some extent.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we study two models of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. Downstream firms' complementary production technologies are endogenously determined by their investments but the timing of investments can be either before or after the input prices are set by the upstream monopolist. When investments are chosen before the upstream monopolist sets the prices, under a fairly general condition, our result does not differ from previous findings that a less efficient downstream firm receives a discount instead of the more efficient one. However, when investments are determined after the input prices are set, the upstream monopolist may charge the more efficient firm a lower price than the less efficient firm. An indirect effect of input prices on the quantity demanded from the downstream firms must be taken into account, through the change of investment incentives. We illustrate these general results using linear demand and quadratic investment costs. Interestingly, both parties in the vertical structure prefer the sequence of play in the wholesaler-retailers model.
Considering that consumer surplus also increases as output is higher, a change of timing from the supplier-manufacturers model to the wholesaler-retailers model constitutes a strict Pareto improvement.
The applicability of these models depends on the likely timing of investments, before or after prices of intermediate goods are set, and the ability of the upstream monopolist to commit to a price. In naming the two models, we argued that for a supplier-manufacturers type of vertical relationship, production cost is mainly determined by technological innovations which must be done in a long horizon and thus may be before input prices are set. While in a wholesaler-retailer relationship, cost involved in the selling process is easily controllable by the downstream firms' managerial effort and may be done after input prices are set. However, this is only for conceptual convenience and does not apply to every setting. As was discussed later on, since both parties are better off under the sequence of play in the wholesaler-retailers model, it is probably more reasonable to choose this model especially when at least one of the two parties is flexible in its timing.
Admittedly, it is also very likely that some portion of the downstream firm's cost is determined before this vertical relationship builds, and the remaining portion is still variable after prices of the intermediate goods are set by the upstream firm. While the general ideas within this paper should still apply, the optimal pricing rule will be much more complicated as the number of stages expands to four. Also, the welfare effects of antitrust regulations (bans of price discriminations in some countries) in these three stage models are open for future researches.
From (6), we have , given that the denominator is negative (the second order condition). Also, . ■
Proof of Proposition 4:
Compare (11) to (13), (12) to (14), we have and .
In the wholesaler-retailer model, if firm i were to choose , its profit is which is greater than since . And . ■
Proof of Proposition 5:
In the supplier-manufacturers model, the upstream monopolist's profit from market i is while in the wholesaler-retailers model, its profit is
We can easily verify that when . ■
Proof of Proposition 6:
-25 -Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 indicate that all firms earn a higher profit under the wholesaler-retailers model. Also by Proposition 4, final output in market i is in the wholesaler-retailers model, greater than the final output in the supplier-manufacturers model . As a result, consumer surplus is also greater. ■
